American nation Essay Example For Students

American nation Essay The Second Republic and Its FallOne of many hurdles that Nigeria had to overcome in the attempt to return to civilian rule, and then to have such a new system entrenched, was the fact that competitive politics encouraged recourse to sectional identification. On the one hand, there is need for a understanding of the nature of the dynamics of Nigerian society, especially with regard to the phenomenon of ethnicity. On the other hand, the theoretical formulations which already exist concerning the nature of politics in segmented societies must be confronted so that a closer approximation between such themes and the sociopolitical realities of Nigeria can be achieved (Joseph, 1987:43). The American-style constitution of the second Republic (1979-1983) was designed for Nigerians type of democracy where natural affairs rather than state are promoted to avoid the pattern of British parliamentary system where the winner-takes-all pattern. The parties in America conform to the Constitution due to their disciplinary disposition. In Nigeria, political parties were following the British style of politics, where distribution of revenues among the politician and their clients at national, state and local levels, are the order of the day (Shehu, et al; 1999:34). Bitter conflicts abounded within the political parties in both states and the federal level over the distribution of the spoils; hence, the inability of the politicals to manage the conflicts led to the demise of the democratic government in the Second Republic and the return of the military government. In the program of transition to the Second Republic, the military leaders primary concern was to prevent the recurrence of the mistakes of the First Republic. They believed that if the structures and processed of government and politics that had proved inappropriate in the First Republic could be changed, a stable and effective civilian government was therefore designed to address those fundamental issues, which were historically divisive, and to establish new political institutions, processes, and orientations. The second aspect of the transition involved the making of a new constitution and appropriate institutions. Decree number 25 of 1978 enacted the 1977 Constitution. It differed from the First Republic in 1963, in that, it introduced a United States type presidential system (Nwoked, 199:73). Previously, the executive branch of government derived its powers from the Legislative. Under the 1979 constitution, the President and the Vice-President as well as state governors and thei r deputies, were elected in separate elections. Furthermore, while senate was largely a ceremonial body in the first Republic, the new constitution gave the Senate and the House of Representatives coequal powers. There were other provisions in the 1979 Constitution that aimed at eliminating past loopholes. The first was the federal character principles, which sought to prevent the domination of power by one or a few states, ethnic groups or sections of federal center, and by one or more groups in the states and local government. The Second Republic was born in the elections for the state and federal offices that took place in five rounds during July and August 1979 (Diamond, 1999:434). Even though it was successful, but its image was dainted largely due to the administrate bias stemmed from the presidential election controversy of 1979. In general, the election was considered to be fair and free but the events that took place during the election such as fraud, victimization and electoral malpractices gave room for some of the votes to be disputed and thereby created an avenue for an election tribunal to be conducted. As a result of the ambiguous result of the 1979 Presidential election, its legitimacy was challenged, when UPN opponent Chief Obafemi Awolowo questioned the results of it that had the UPN candidate, Shagari, who supposedly won 25 percent of the vote in only twelve, and hence not quite two-thirds of the nineteen states. The ruling of the electoral commission that he was elected because he had won 25 percent in twelve and two third states (i.e, a quarter of the vote in twelve states and two-thirds of a quarter in a thirteenth) was bitterly challenged by the UPN, but upheld by the Supreme Court. The controversy engendered lasting political enmity between NPN and UPN that was too heavily color subsequent political developments (Diamond, 1995:434). The political tension spread to engender political alliances. The formation of a government by NPN, with the backing of NPP, being third largest party, whose nominees were offered ministerial, legislative and other positions, in a way, recreated a similar alliance identical to NPC-NCNC accord of the First Republic. The NPP frustration in this alliance system was manifested in its ability to affect the policies of the federal government and claim a larger share of the spoils. One faction of the NPN was of the view that too much share of executive and legislative offices had been given to NPP in return for its legislative cooperation, while the Yoruba faction of the NPN felt unease with the Northern and Eastern alignment of political forces which they figured might perpetuate the exclusion from the presidency (Shehu et al, 1999:54). Disappointed with the lack of consultations and patronage, the NPP-NPN accord never worked as it intended, and, consequently, on July 1981, the alliance collapsed. At first, the NPP state governors joined non-NPN governors in protesting against the appointment of presidential liaison officers to the state capitals, where they could act as a focus for NPN patronage and undermine the political pre-eminence of state governors. All the non-NPN governors strongly opposed the federal governments proposal for the division of revenues between federal, state and local governments (Shehu, et al; 1999:34). Meanwhile, the informal alliance became more important for the NPN, and this also cut sharply across region and ethnicity. Many of the tacit collaborations with the NPN came from the two Igbo states and from elsewhere outside the partys far northern base. These developments raised the possibility of a historic realignment in which two political parties, one being conservatives and the other progressive, would contest for power on a national basis (Joseph, 1994:6). As Diamond notes:Despite the increasing polarization between the ruling NPN and the UPN led opposition, there was some cause for hope in the fact that this clearage was far less centered on ethnicity and region than was political conflict in the First Republic. As a result of not only expanding education and communication, but also the deep inequalities and contradictions engendered by oil boom, class and ideology were coming to play a more significant role in political conflict. This was seen to have developed in both Kano and Kaduna states where PRP party conflict centered on class and ideology. According to Diamond, three interrelated crises developed along this line in 1980 and 1981. The first was a deep split in the leadership of the PRP, not unlike that in the Action Group in 1962, stating that the stance of moderation and national political accommodation was espoused by PRP President Aminu Kano and his aides, while it was the two elected governors of Kano and Kaduna who favored confrontation and a more radical, ideological approach. The latter faction was the larger of the two, containing most of the PRPs youth support, founding intellectuals, and legislative representatives. They supported the participation of two governors in the meetings of the nine opposition governors, while the party establishment opposed it and ordered it to cease. Out of mutual expulsions, two opposing party structures emerged, each claiming to be the genuine PRP. In a controve rsial decision early in 1981, FEDECO officially recognized the Aminu Kano faction, further eroding the legitimacy of that crucial regulatory body (Diamond, 1995:435). Problems And Challenges Facing The Construction Industry Construction EssayAs documented by Ottman; the leading figures in the military junta of Buhari..were predominantly northern in origin and conservative in outlook. They were drawn from the generation who had been encouraged by northern ministers, notably Shagari himself, to join the army and make up the northern quota of recruits to the officer Corps in the 1960s. They shared training, war-time experience in the federal cause and personal friendships and had connections with their civilian counterparts in the Kaduna Mafia' (Ottman, 199:39). The Coup leaders justified the second return of the army in Nigeria politics by stating that the country needed to be redeemed from the the grave economic predicament and uncertainty that had been imposed on the country by the inept and corrupt leadership of the civilian government has imposed on the country (Diamond, 1999:440). Major General Buhari and his deputy, Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon further justified the takeover by stating that rigging of the elections by the political parties would have illegitimately ushered the ruling party- NPN- into continued corruptive civilian rulership, thereby fostering the countrys economic downturn. For those reasons, the new military government sought to impose on Nigerian society the military virtues of order, discipline and central command under the direction of the Supreme Military Council, recreating the forms of military administration of Murtala regime. They also hurriedly made a bold move to tackle the problem of corruption and to curb further waste in the government. With the sacking of more than three hundred top officials in the civil service, police and customs, including the detention of hundreds of former politicians, the former President and Vice-President, ministers and legislatures, were also imprisoned. In a further move to reform the country of its ills, they authorized the seizing of cash from the homes of leading politicians, and froze their accounts. By cutting down the amount of import and reducing the travel allowances for Nigerian travels, they argued that Nigerian foreign exchange will be preserved. The raiding and the arrest of the operators of the Black market currency was a further justification of what their plans were (Othman, et al 1999:24). These initial moves became very popular particularly among students, trade unions and other professionals. Even majority newspapers supported the new regimes mention to restore accountability to public life. But later in the early stage of Buhari, it became obvious that its intention was not implement the accountability measures. It began to act rigidly and even refused to be questioned and scrutinized by the media. And, with unprecedented harshness, arrogance, and impurity, the Buhari regime, turned on the Constituencies that had welcomed its arrival (Diamond, 1995:441). Public trust of the new military was further eroded when they announced several controversial decrees that they will use to administer the country militarily. Decree 2 enabled the government to detain people arbitrarily, to try people by military tribunals, and restricted the authority of the courts. Decree 3 provided for military tribunals to try former public officials suspected of corruption and misconduct in office. While Decree 4 limited the rights of journalists to criticize public officials (Othman, et al 1999:39). The death penalty was extended to cover a wide range of economic, violent and anti-social offenses, and public executions were introduced. With these coercive measures, the regime also was able to try politicians by giving them long prison sentences, without any chances of appeal. Both the public and Nigerian Bar Associated protested and boycotted the trials. Even though that the people were gratified to see that convictions were metted to the most corrupt politicia ns and for the acquittals of others who were innocent, but were equally concern for the permanent detention of some politicians without any charges. Worst still, was the consternation that grew among the public in the military government favoritism of the Northern NPN Kingpins who were not convicted or charged with any wrong doing. As Diamond observed, the regime came increasingly to be dreaded as the military wing of the NPN (Diamond, 1995:441). Public disenchantment grew by the regimes repressiveness and arrogance in its assault on the press (Diamond, 1995:441). Both Decree 4 and Decree 2 were used to justify the arrests. Many Nigerians journalists and editors in January 1984, which affected the news coverage and further alienated the masses and the intelligentsia. Added to the public displeasure of the regime was the Nigerian Security Organization (NSO) tactics of obstructing public assembly and forcible detention of any group leader that are found to be organizing any public even that is against the government. This action by the Government further led to the banning of prominent interest group like the Nigerian Medical Association and National Association of Nigerian students. The intensification of public disaffection was also engendered by the increasing economic hardship on the people which was exacerbated by the various austerity measures that the Buharis military government implemented. Some of these economic measures that the government introduced were in some ways effective in helping towards balancing Nigerias external payments, they came at the price of deepening recession. During 1984, an estimated 50,000 civil servants were retrenched, retired or dismissed. Tens of thousands more industrial workers also lost their jobs as factories remained desperately short of imported raw materials and spare parts (Diamond, 1999:442). The rate of inflation was up to annual rate of 40 percent due to the severe shortages of goods and so was the decline in GDP by and estimated 10 percent. The repressive strategy of Buharis military further engendered deep resentment and bitterness among the people who feel that they had been denied of their personal freedom. In addition, according to Othman, the military government was increasingly driven by dissension over strategies of economic management, the detention and trials of political detainees and the rising power of Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, the Chief of staff, supreme headquarters, and the driving force behind the regimes authoritarian policies, and of the Nigerian Security Organization (NSO) (Othman, 1999:40). Two factors were instrumental to the final demise of the military regime; one was the risking of what Diamond called political convulsion, an attempt to impose a monolithic order on Nigerias vigorously polaristic society (Diamond, 1999:443). The second factor was the regimes declaration in July, 1985, of their intention or plan to return Nigeria to Civilian rule. These actions further isolated Buhari and Idiagbon from their military colleagues , including their arrogance in ignoring critical opinion even among its senior military ranks.